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Abstract—Distributed system architectures such as cloud com-
puting or the emergent architectures of the Internet Of Things,
present significant challenges for security and privacy. Specif-
ically, in a complex application there is a need to securely
delegate access control mechanisms to one or more parties,
who in turn can govern methods that enable multiple other
parties to be authenticated in relation to the services that
they wish to consume. We identify shortcomings in an existing
proposal by Xu et al for multiparty authentication and evaluate
a novel model from Al-Aqrabi et al that has been designed
specifically for complex multiple security realm environments.
The adoption of a Session Authority Cloud ensures that resources
for authentication requests are scalable, whilst permitting the
necessary architectural abstraction for myriad hardware IoT
devices such as actuators and sensor networks, etc. In addition,
the ability to ensure that session credentials are confirmed with
the relevant resource principles means that the essential rigour
for multiparty authentication is established.
Keywords— Cloud computing, distributed systems, security, au-
thentication, trust, multiparty, Internet of Things
I. INTRODUCTION
As both individuals and organisations embrace the benefits of
cloud computing infrastructure, more and more data storage and busi-
ness process services are being transferred or established in clouds
[1]. This shift from local to remote infrastructure drastically reduces
the effort and expenditure [4] required for system maintenance [2],
[3], enabling system users to concentrate on business concerns such
as QoS and performance, etc.
The rapid uptake of services delivered via clouds has meant
that matters of convenience have overtaken concerns about security
and privacy. Distributed systems such as clouds inherently introduce
security vulnerabilities that can be accessed remotely if insufficient
security measures are in place. Cloud-based systems have specific
limitations with regard to security and these are discussed by Al-
Aqrabi et al [5].
There still remain enterprises and individuals who are reluctant
to adopt cloud infrastructure, and the lack of awareness of secure
methods of cloud adoption limits the business advantages that are
available to users and enterprises [6], [7].
Choo [9] and Liu [8] both describe the need to ensure that both
the providers and consumers of cloud computing have the appropriate
mechanisms deployed for security and privacy. As such there has been
considerable research activity [12], [13], [16], [17] pertaining to the
security of cloud applications and infrastructure [10], [11], [14], [15].
A. Multiparty service delivery and security
As enterprises are beginning to become aware of the power of
data collection, analysis, modelling and prediction, they are starting
to realise systems that are a more faithful representation of business
processes. This means that the underlying digital services must
demonstrate both robustness and flexibility to tolerate new and
unanticipated business scenarios. As such, the actual process flows
may be difficult to predict in some instances, especially if a business
offers bespoke services or products to customers, where a transaction
may execute once only [28].
As a consequence of this, the eventual application that is deliv-
ered is underpinned by a collection of disparate services that are
orchestrated at run-time, that may have origins in organisations that
are heterogeneous. Each of the host organisations will have adopted
security measures that are unique to the enterprise, with the effect
that an application composed of multiple services will thus present a
number of different security realms.
Each realm typically consists of data that represents a collection of
resource principals, that are registered with a trusted principal such
as a certificate authority. The principals are governed by a set of
security policies that control access to other services and resources
within the scope of the application [29]. The certificate authority is
deemed to be trustworthy across the application domain and is present
to validate users and functions [30].
It is essential that each security realm is authenticated against
to ensure that a principal has the appropriate security privileges to
consume services marshalled by a security realm. The identity of a
principal needs to be confirmed by the correct authentication process
of the relevant realm so as to correctly identify and establish who the
principal is. During the authentication process, security credentials
that were given to the principal by the relevant security realm are
used to authenticate it.
In the case of more complex application architectures, such as
cloud-based services provision, each cloud may hide multiple in-
stances of other clouds and/or services. It follows that not only will
there be numerous authentication mechanisms to keep maintained,
but they will have to be invoked dynamically at runtime on demand.
If separate authentication processes are established across disparate
security realms, there is a potential for a significant increase in au-
thentication workload and the consequential side-effects on network
bandwidth and computational cycles.
The scenario where a multiparty session is composed of many two-
party sessions is explored by Hada et al [31], who demonstrates that
there is a need for a protocol for multiparty session authentication.
Thre is an inherent challenge here that it is not always possible for
a session participant to establish whether another session participant
is actually a member of the multiparty session in progress.
The rest of this article is organised as follows. First, we consider
the main challenges for secure authentication in distributed systems
infrastructure such as cloud computing, where multiple parties are
present. In particular, we shall consider the key obstacles that are
presented by environments that are composed of many different
parties of varying capabilites such as with the Internet of Things
(IoT).
Second, we shall briefly review some existing approaches to
managing multiparty authentication, and critically discuss a model
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developed by Xu [29]. Third, we propose a distinct model for secure
multiparty authentication that addresses shortcomings in current
models, and explain how it can be deployed by way of an example.
Finally, we describe some concluding remarks.
II. KEY CHALLENGES FOR MULTIPARTY ENVIRONMENTS
Whilst multiparty authentication is a complex challenge in a multi-
cloud environment, the complexity increases considerably when we
consider the potential proliferation of devices in IoT systems. In such
systems, there may be 1:1 mappings between system access devices
and the clouds themselves, but there is also the additional potential
complication of myriad hardware devices that possess varying degrees
of functionality and capability. Such devices can be found in Wireless
Sensor Networks for instance, which are often adaptive entities
that can embrace the addition or removal of sensor nodes during
operation.
If Gartner’s prediction is true - “Gartner, Inc. forecasts that 8.4
billion connected things will be in use worldwide in 2017, up 31
percent from 2016, and will reach 20.4 billion by 2020.” [33] -
then the demand for authentication of devices will be a significant
challenge to address, particularly since there will be insufficient
capacity to manually authenticate even a fraction of the devices, and
therefore some automation will be mandatory.
A fundamental challenge in a complicated environment such as
the IoT or multi-clouds is the need to manage and assure the
communications that enable the requisite authentication approvals to
be enacted [17].
The use of Single Sign On (SSO) has become a convention
for users to conveniently access systems that are composed of
multiple sub-systems, each of which may be a different application
deployment. SSO removes the need for users to enter differing
security credentials multiple times, and is enabled by the use of a
key exchange mechanism to manage the provision of authentication
credentials that have been certified by a named authority [18], [19].
However, the relative simplicity of a mechanism to provide a secure
method of key exchange is inadequate for the situation when we
need multiple parties to be able to trust each other in a dynamic,
heterogeneous environment, and therefore SSO is lacking in this
regard.
In the next section we shall discuss existing approaches to multi-
party authentication.
III. EXISTING MULTI-PARTY APPROACHES
In a multiparty concept, multiple parties can join or leave a session
dynamically. The parties are allowed or removed from the session
by a session authority. A simplified drawing showing the concept is
presented in the below figure.
In this concept, a session authority controls the authentication of
all session participants. Existing session participants can introduce
new participants to the session authority for limited transactions. The
session authority issues a secret session key to all running session
participants.
In practice the session authority communicates with multiple
session handlers. Whenever a new participant joins or existing one
leaves, the key is refreshed and shared with the active session
participants using forward security techniques [24].
The session authority recognises the session participants with the
help of participant IDs. A participant leaving the session cannot reuse
its participant ID for re-entering.
Similarly, a reused ID will not be assigned to a new participant.
The participants join through introduction only and need not share
any secret artefacts to gain the session key. However, two participants
acting as partners can share private keys using the Diffie-Hellman
algorithm.
Prior work related to multiparty identity authentication in multi-
cloud environments [29], [24] has described models that utilise more
sophisticated methods than password management through SSO. The
Fig. 1. The multiparty session authentication concept.
concept of direct trust is introduced as part of their mechanism, with
[20] introducing group credentials across security realms within inter-
cloud communications.
The basic premise is that a new actor (either human or device)
should be able to access a system as a result of a secret that is shared
amongst a group. This is developed further by [29] and [24] whereby
a third party, who is trusted, can discover and establish permissions
on behalf of the actor.
In such a scenario, the system can observe that an actor is
associated with a group that is trusted, and therefore will assign
permissions based on the association. The use of trust relationships
opens up the potential for actors to gain access to systems based upon
their reputation, which is more akin to human social networks.
At any one time, it is conceivable that there will be many system
access requests to complete in a secure and timely manner. This is one
aspect of the emerging IoT scenarios that is particularly challenging,
in terms of the sheer volume of potential requests that may exist.
The Session Authority (SA) is a role of fundamental importance
in that it manages the confirmation and approval of access requests
to the system. The SA is preceded by a Multi-Party Session Handler
MPSH who formulates a queue of requests for subsequent process-
ing by the (SA).
Since the workload of the SA is likely to vary, and at least will be
expected to scale upwards when an application grows by the addition
of additional actors and their devices, one approach to deal with the
elasticity in demand is to adopt an SA Cloud (SAC) as proposed
by [23], [24] and illustrated in Figure 2.
IV. A MODEL FOR MULTIPARTY AUTHENTICATION
In this section, a model for dynamic authentication interactions in
a distributed environment (in this example multiple clouds) is shown
in Figure 2 [24]. All members of multiple sub-domains may interact
within a session and all such sessions are identified by the Session
Authority Cloud (SAC). Session keys comprise of the root key of
the cloud, a sub-domain key, and the portion identifying the session.
This means that there will be multiple session keys valid for a
session, each having a common field for the session, but varying
fields for cloud root keys and sub-domain keys. There is no need
for any negotiation among the clouds because the session authority
cloud is aware of all the clouds and their sub-domains.
The schematic of the robust multiparty model is shown in Figure
2. The ground rules of the proposal are:
Fig. 2. A multiparty session authentication model [24].
• Each session participant should be a tenant of at least one cloud
in the multi-cloud framework controlled by the session authority
cloud.
• If a potential participant is not a cloud member, the introducing
participant will have to share credentials with it for joining its
own cloud.
• Each session will have multiple valid keys. While the session
key field will be common (refreshed on change of no of
participants), the cloud root keys and sub-domain (security
realm) keys will vary depending upon the membership profiles
of the participants.
The session begins with a user having membership in any security
realm (cloud C) that the trusted principal recognises. We assume to
provide access to some resources such as database objects in clouds
A and B if the SAC approves the request forwarded by the principal.
It is also assumed that SAC will not entertain any request not
forwarded by the principal. The user requesting access is neither a
member of cloud A nor a member of cloud B. In essence, the user
is a member of a security realm that is a different cloud (cloud C),
which is trusted by the SAC (which means that the third cloud is a
member of the SAC −DB).
Most importantly, the principal should recognise who is the user
because the SAC trusts the principal for accepting the session
request. Hence, the only way the user can gain access to database
files on clouds A and B is to send a request to the session authority
cloud through the session handler F .
The session handler will only forward requests of the trusted
principal and hence the requests need to be forwarded through the
login of the trusted principal.
The principal A places a request to the session handler to gain
access to resources A and B for the user (the user knows their URLs
but does not have any access to them).
On the request of the session handler (F ), the principal A shares
the root and sub domain keys of the user. These keys may be viewed
as two packets of a finite size (for example, 1024 Bytes each).
The SAC checks the keys with the help of a database SAC−DB
to assist it (may be viewed as a huge security vault having all root
and sub-domain keys of the clouds registered with it).
On confirmation from SAC −DB, the SAC approves access to
database files A and B stored on clouds A and B respectively. It
forwards its approval to the SACs session handler (SAC − SH).
The SAC−SH may be viewed as a separate dynamic database that
caches all approvals from the SAC and forwards them to respective
clouds for opening the accesses.
Cloud A stores the session ID and key in its registry or cache
and then sends a response to SAC. SAC sends a reply for session
approval to F . Then, F sends a response for session approval to
access the application on cloud A or B.
Typically, the authentication processes occur between SAC and
session members (users and services). Figure 3 shows a worst case
Fig. 3. A worst case scenario where either n users and one service, or there
are 2 users and 2 services.
Fig. 4. A best case scenario where there are n session users and m services,
where both n and m are much greater than 2.
scenario, where there is only one user and m services in a session.
Conversely, worst case scenarios exist when there are either n users
and one service, or there are 2 users and 2 services. In each of these
cases, the authentication process cannot be simplified and the SAC
process offers no significant advantage over direct authentication. In
addition, the two-party session technique does not address the issue
of different Cross-Realm Authentication, which requires credential
conversion and the establishment of authentication paths. On the other
hand, Figure 4 shows a best case scenario for the multiparty model. In
this case there are n session users and m services, where both n and
m are much greater than 2. The benefit is obtained since each user
will be able to access all of the m services. Without this model, the
authentication processes must be performed within sessions because
each user has to be authorised by all of the services that they want
to access.
V. DIFFERENT SECURITY REALMS
If we consider the situation whereby authentication is required
across two different security realms, it is necessary to a) convert
credentials so that they can be shared, and b) define specific authen-
tication paths between the relevant realms. Existing methods for two-
party session authentication are not able to resolve such scenarios.
One approach is to use federated authentication, although the
negotiation amongst parties is time intensive, especially when one
or more parties requires the authentication path to be amended or
augmented to their satisfaction. The complexity of this situation
escalates rapidly as more parties are added, either as actors wanting
access, or myriad services distributed across differing security realms.
The fact that existing approaches do not comprehensively address
the increasingly prevalent situation where multiple actors have a need
to access multiple services, across multiple security realms (such as a
multi-cloud environment), means that business models that are based
upon the distributed provision of services are potentially hampered
by the ability to scale authentication at a less than optimal rate. We
foresee this as a significant barrier for secure IoT, as the orchestration
of services (latterly microservice architectures [34], [35]) held within
containers is a natural progression as interest develops for scalable
business models and infrastructure.
VI. EVALUATING MULTIPARTY MODELS
We now proceed to examine the multiparty scenario described by
Xu [29] in order to understand some of the pertinent challenges faced
by multiparty authentication models. The multiparty model of Xu
[29] employs a SA entity that oversees the authorisation of sessions
against session requests from existing partners. With this arrangement
a session can be established by an actor that is able to provide an
instance ID; this means that there is no need to identify the resources
to be accessed, nor to initiate contact with their principals.
If two session parties, A and B have already communicated and
established trust, either A or B can introduce a new party, C. The
SA will approve the request merely because A and B are in a current
session, irrespective of the means used to access the resources, which
may be either legitimate or unauthorised.
A secret session key is provided to C to join the session. If any
one of the parties leave the session (for instance A), the secret key
will be refreshed such that A cannot rejoin on its own (silently). If
A does attempt to join, it will be detected and considered a potential
security breach.
Thus, A needs to seek sponsorship of B or C as they are already
authenticated in a session, even though this C was introduced to
the session by A earlier. Therefore, the model proposed by Xu
enables session participants to introduce new parties, a decision that
is endorsed by the SA without any conditions.
Furthermore, the SA has no concern what each party is accessing
within a session. This is significant in the following situation. If
parties A, B, and C are accessing a restricted database, the SA
does not seek approval from the owner of the database.
Hence, if C becomes the provider of a session instance ID, as
part of an inside attack upon the database, the SA will honour the
request as no further checks are made. In fact, the database owner is
an invisible security realm for the SA, as it is only concerned with
a session S via the session ID and instance ID.
If all three parties were adversarial attackers and were successful
at breaching the database be creating a SI and a CI , any request
for part D to join the session would be approved by the SA and the
actual authority of the database would never be contacted to confirm
or deny credentials.
To summarise the observations so far with respect to the multiparty
model of Xu [29]:
(a) The SA has no knowledge about resources used in the session
and is only concerned with CI and SI;
(b) The SA has no access to knowledge of the principal owners
(the actual authority) of resources for a session;
(c) The SA never contacts the principal resource owners as long as
an instance key is provided by a party that already has access
to the resource;
(d) The SA has no other mediator to assist with authentication
checks;
(e) The SA cannot control the addition of access to resources
during an executing session.
In contrast, we shall now consider the multiparty model that
employs a Session Authority Cloud (SAC) entity [24], illustrated
in Figure 6.
The SAC differs from the SA of Xu [29] in that it includes
a security vault database (SAC − DB) to facilitate authentication
checks beyond that of session coordination only. This database
Fig. 5. Multiparty business scenario as described by Xu [29].
Fig. 6. Multiparty authentication model as described by Al-Aqrabi [24].
provides knowledge of what activities are being performed within a
session, which removes the potential vulnerability of the SA having
the power to grant session access to a proposer without requiring any
resource checks.
The SAC − DB, together with the SACSessionHandler
(SAC − SH), ensure that session participants are authenticated
only when all details of the required resources are confirmed, rather
than relying only on the collection of session keys as the sole
authentication mechanism. If the resource checks fail, the SAC
will not allow the session to execute. As such, the SAC contacts
the destination resources for confirmation, which is absent from the
previous model [29].
The fact that the SA will honour requests for access without
further authentication, means that Xu’s model cannot protect an
application from multiparty adversarial attacks, which are typically
initiated from the inside. As the resource owner belongs to a realm
that the SA is not concerned with (as it requires only a session and
instance ID), one nefarious party can grant access to another.
This could be an inside agent that enables an additional external
agent to compromise the application for malicious purposes. We feel
that this is a major barrier to the adoption of such a model, partic-
ularly for IoT architectures where there is a reasonable expectation
that additional devices will be added to the system in the future, that
will require authentication through verified credentials.
Approval is requested by the SAC from the resource owner (e.g.,
database owner), who is a security realm principal and external to
the session. Furthermore, the SAC takes individual approvals for the
resources accessed and hence, a new resource access request cannot
be added during a session that is executing.
For example, if we consider the playing of video content from
embedded links within a database: as soon as an embedded video
link is launched, an approval screen with a pop-up directing the users
to involve the SAC again, who in turn will seek its access from
the principal owner of the videos. The SAC is supported by the
SAC − DB and SAC − SH to ensure that the principals of the
resources are contacted for appropriate authentication and approval.
Alternatively, an IoT based network may utilise wireless commu-
nication to enable wireless sensors and other mobile devices to move
into and out of the scope of an application. This might enable a
network to utilise opportunistic sensing, or packet transport from IoT
appliances such as vehicles. In this situation, it will be necessary to
establish a trust relationship that may be transient and limited in its
ability to access certain resources within the application. In this case,
the SAC again is assisted by the SAC −DB and SAC − SH , so
that access is provided to the requisite parties in a secure manner.
VII. CONTRIBUTION
A more substantial process of establishing a multiparty session
is a key differentiator between the two models. This extra emphasis
within the second model [23] ensures that the trust relationship is
more secure from the outset.
Access to resources is strictly limited to the approvals by the
resource principals of cloud A and cloud B, who are named owner-
ship entities rather than an adversary who succeeds in generating an
instance ID. In addition, even if the principals are not in the session,
they can monitor it from outside.
Finally, we consider the more demanding scenario of large col-
lections of IoT devices being present as part of emergent system
architectures, whose fundamental capabilities have to be based upon
secure scalability. The SA entity of Xu’s model serves as a constraint
in that is cannot function without intervention to generate and share
instance IDs.
Thus, the multiparty model proposed in [23] presents two siginif-
icant contributions as follows:
1) The employment of a SAC, together with a SAC −DB and
SAC − SH ensures that session authority is granted with full
cooperation of the resource principals, which provides more
rigour when establishing a trust relationship at the outset;
2) Scalability of authentication requests is catered for through the
abstraction of the SAC; hardware devices such as actuators,
sensor networks, etc., can be fully hidden behind the SAC and
the SAC − SH entities.
Together, contributions (1) and (2) provide a more robust base upon
which to consider the security of multiparty application architecture.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In conclusion this article examines approaches to multiparty
authentication through the lens of applications that have a future
requirement to scale upwards, such as the emergent growth of IoT
networks. Such architectures are dynamic, must exhibit elasticity,
and also present a multitude of potential security vulnerabilities.
Nonetheless, the appeal of distributed hardware that is networked
provides a compelling motivation for business and individual users
alike to adopt such technologies.
We have selected two proposed models of multiparty authentica-
tion and examined their suitability with respect to the IoT scenario
described above. We have identified that models which can be
utilised for Service Oriented Architectures need to ensure that the
authentication controls, policies and protocols need to protect against
the inevitable multiparty interactions that will have to be satisfied.
We examine a novel multiparty authentication approach [21],
[23] that provides a robust mechanism for marshalling security
interactions with distributed infrastructures such as multi-cloud and
IoT networks. This model is pertinent when multiple members of
heterogeneous security realms have a desire to access a variety of
services, under the governance of a trusted principal. The model thus
enables authentication dynamically during execution of a multiparty
application, whilst ensuring that there is a minimal requirement to
convert security credentials as the services are accessed. A major
motivation for the adoption of this model is that of authentication
simplification between two or more services that are unrelated, before
the services are permitted to exchange data. Only when authentication
checks have been made with resource principals is data exchange
permitted.
We intend to develop this work to identify and address new
challenges posed by heterogeneous IoT environments. Key areas of
focus are as follows:
• Developing proofs of secure authentication protocols for multi-
party scenarios;
• Using hardware-in-the-loop to deploy IoT networks, enabling
authentication overheads to be evaluated for a variety of use
cases, particularly in relation to different networking protocols
such as LoraWAN and Zigbee;
• Monitoring and assessing the impact of energy consumption
of the authentication protocols upon constrained hardware re-
sources;
• Investigating methods for the visualisation of authentication and
multiparty behavioural signatures to improve resilience towards
more sophisticated adversarial attacks;
• Developing mechanisms to automate trust formation through
authentication for resource-constrained hardware.
• Exploring the use of SDN to manage network traffic across IoT
devices in a multiparty authentication scheme [32].
• Developing resource scheduling algorithms to manage multi-
party authentication workload across multiple clouds and IoT
hardware [43].
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